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Abstract—In this paper, we focus on studying the effects of var-
ious image operations on sensor fingerprint camera identification.
It is known that artifacts in the image processing pipeline, such
as pixel defects or unevenness of the responses in the CCD array
as well black current noise leave telltale footprints. Nowadays,
camera identification based on the analysis of these artifacts is
a well established technology for linking an image to a specific
camera. The sensor fingerprint is estimated from images taken
from a device. A similarity measure is deployed in order to
associate an image with the camera. However, when the images
used in the sensor fingerprint estimation have been processed
using e.g. gamma correction, contrast enhancement, histogram
equalization or white balance, the properties of the detection
statistic change, hence affecting fingerprint detection. In this
paper we study this effect experimentally, towards quantifying
the robustness of fingerprint detection in the presence of image
processing operations.
I. INTRODUCTION
Source camera identification is a well studied problem in
digital forensics [1], [2] over the past decade in various
domains. Most known applications are investigation, such as
child pornography, image and video piracy or image authenti-
cation check (e.g. to detect malicious alterations of an image).
Nowadays, digital images can be easily edited and manipulated
with sophisticated tools (i.e., image processing tools) ,not
only for malicious but also for artistic purposes. Since such
tools are available to a cell phone such manipulations alter
not only the perceived image content but also the embedded
camera fingerprint. This creates a robustness challenge to
standard source camera identification algorithms, such as [3],
[4]. The vast majority of published work focuses on still image
source identification and only a handful of papers analyze the
effects of image alterations on its robustness [5], [6], [7]. The
most common image alterations tackled by published work
primarily focus on geometric translations such as rotation,
zoom, crop and on JPEG compression. However, to the best
of our knowledge, non of the published work have analyzed
the alterations of telltale footprints, when the captured image
have undergone image processing manipulations.
In this paper, we focus our study on image alterations that
are commonly used to improve the quality content [8] (e.g. the
low pass filter, contrast enhancement, histogram equalization,
gamma correction and white balance). We address the robust-
ness of source camera identification when the images taken
by that camera have undergone image processing [8]. More
specifically, we intend to determine the model and brand of a
cell phone camera used in image acquisition in the presence
of such image processing attacks. It works by first estimates
the sensor fingerprint from a set of images positively known to
have been taken by a particular camera. Once the fingerprint is
acquired one can prove that a given image under investigation
was taken by the exact same camera by using a signal detection
approach. A positive match between an image and a camera
fingerprint ties the image with a very high certainty to its
source camera. Without loss of generality the experiments
were conducted on cell phone cameras, due to their wide use
in everyday life.
A standard sensor-based fingerprint identification method
for camera brand and model identification is proposed by
Lukas et al. [3]. The same methodology has been used in
various related works [9],[1]. In July 2011 it passed the
Daubert challenge 1 in the State of Alabama. That is, results of
this method can be employed as evidence in court of law. By
the term camera brand, we denote the camera manufacturer
(e.g., Samsung or LG), and by the term model, we denote
the unique product name. Fingerprint detection pinpointing
the employed imaging sensor type and make is based on the
telltale effects created within the proprietary image formation
pipeline in cameras. Sensor fingerprints are essential artifacts
due to charge couple device (CCD) sensor cell defects and
minor make deviations from their standard type. That is, the
fingerprint detection methodology is applicable to all digital
image devices that contain CCD or CMOS sensors.
In this paper, we investigate the sensitivity of the identi-
fication performance against the aforementioned image ma-
nipulations. It is known that artifacts in the image processing
pipeline, such as pixel defects or unevenness of the responses
in the CCD array and black current noise leave telltale foot-
prints. Nowadays, camera identification based on the analysis
of these artifacts is a well established technology for linking an
image to a specific camera. The sensor fingerprint is estimated
from images taken from a device. A similarity measure is
deployed in order to associate an image with the fingerprint
when it exceeds a certain threshold. Moreover, the present
study differs from previous camera identification methods, in
terms of feature fusion.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Related work
in source camera identification is revised in Section II. The
technology behind sensor based fingerprint identification, is
given in Section III. The details of the experiments and their
results are provided in Section IV. In section V, we discuss
future work and draw our conclusion.
1https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Daubert standard
II. OVERVIEW OF CAMERA IDENTIFICATION
Camera identification is a well established research area. A
variety of methods have been proposed, primarily exploiting
the residual artifacts and imperfections in the imaging pipeline.
There are two separate camera identification methodologies
according to the information source they use. The first one
consists of methods which take advantage of existing sensor
noise and artifacts in the CCD array [10]. The second one
approaches camera identification by employing demosaicking
artifacts taking place in raw image processing [11].
There have three leading studies on camera identification
based on sensor noise. Geradts et al. [12] observed that large
CCD arrays often contain a variety of manufacturing defects,
which, in total, amount to fixed pattern noise. In addition,
camera electronics generate random dark current [8]. They
have observed that, while dark current has limited potential
in building a forensic signature, the fixed pattern noise of the
CCD array is instrumental in constructing a unique camera
fingerprint. Kurosawa et al. [10] and Lukas et al.[3] also tuned
their attention to the pattern noise of CCD arrays. It was found
that the systematic part of the noise does not change much
from image to image, it is relatively stable over camera life
span and operating conditions and consists of the fixed pattern
noise plus Photo Response Non Uniformity noise (PRNU)
caused by the pixel non uniformities is a more persistent
camera feature [13]. The PRNU can be reliably extracted
by averaging the denoising residuals of several images [1]
resulting in an image pattern that plays the role of a camera
fingerprint. In this sense, camera identification has similarities
to image watermarking [14], the difference being that the
camera fingerprint is produced by the image sensors while the
watermark is primarily inserted by deliberate human action.
Commercial image devices use a single mosaic structured
color filter array (CFA) rather than having separate filters
for each color component. Camera models typically employ
propriety interpolation algorithms in recreating the missing
color values. The grid interpolation process, in turn, leaves
footprints, such as correlation patterns between contiguous bit
planes. Kharazzi et al. [4] tried to capture the differences in
CFA configuration and color processing pipeline by a feature
based approach. They focused on image features, such as
mean value of the RGB channels, correlations between color
components, differences in neighborhood probability distribu-
tion, wavelet domain statistics and image quality measures.
Extensions of this work can be found in [15],[16]. Since the
residuals of interpolation algorithms depend on the nature of
the captured content, these algorithms were fine tuned by
separately treating the smooth and non smooth image regions.
In another study, Long and Huang used interpixel correlations
originating from demosaicking camera fingerprinting [11].
They defined a quadratic pixel correlation model and obtained
a coefficient matrix for each color band based on this model.
Swaminathan et al. [17] investigated the demosaicking artifacts
using an analysis by synthesis method. They divided the
image into three regions based on gradient features in a local
neighborhood and they estimated interpolation coefficients
through Singular Value Decomposition (SVD) for each region
and each color band separately. Then, they reinterpolated the
sampled CFA pattern and chose the one that minimizes the
difference between the estimated final image and actual image
produced by the camera.
III. CAMERA SENSOR IDENTIFICATION BASED ON PRNU
The main artifact that is being used to estimate a sensor
fingerprint for each camera is the so called Photo-Response
Non-Uniformity (PRNU) [13]. Each pixel value generated
from either CCD or CMOS sensors slightly but consistently
differs from its nominal value. This forms a specific pattern on
every image taken by this camera and is known to be unique
for every camera model. A camera fingerprint is generated
by images known to have been taken by this camera. Once
estimated, it can be tested whether it resides on an image and
thus tell if it was taken using this specific camera.
The estimation method of the PRNU fingerprint can be
seen in Figure 1. Analytic description of the PRNU estimation
model is given bellow.
Fig. 1. Estimation of the PRNU fingerprint
Let us assume that the output image will be denoted as I
and the image captured under the absence of any imperfections
as I0. The following sensor output model was established in
[3].
f = f0 + f0K+ v (1)
where K is the PNRU factor (fingerprint) and v includes
all other components, such as dark current, shot noise, read-
out noise and quantization noise. The fingerprint K can be
estimated from N images f1, f2, . . . , fN taken by the camera
and f0K is understood element wise. The pixel intensity
of the i, j-th pixel in the kth image fk will be denoted
Iijk, 1 ≤ i ≤ k1, 1 ≤ j ≤ k2. Let W1,W2, . . . ,WN be
the noise residuals obtained using a denoising filter F as
Wk = fk − F (fk), k = 1, . . . , N (2)
Assuming the following linearized sensor model for the
residual
Wk = fkK+Ξk, k = 1, . . . , N (3)
where Ξk is a n1×n2 matrix of independent and identically
distributed (i.i.d.) Gaussian random variables with zero mean,
the maximum likelihood estimation of the PNRU multiplica-






The detection of the fingerprint K in W can be formulated
as a two channel hypothesis testing problem:
H0(non matching image) : K1 6= K2
H1(matching image) : K1 = K2,
(5)
where:
K̂1 = K1 +Ξ1
W = IK2 +Ξ2,
(6)
where the estimate of the camera fingerprint, K̂1, is obtained
using (4), W is the noise residual and a Gaussian corrupting
noise Ξ1,2 ∼ N (µ, σ2Ξ). A good approximation to the gener-
alized likelihood ratio test for the aforementioned hypothesis
testing problem is the normalized correlation ρ(K̂1, K̂2; 0, 0)
between K̂1 and K̂2:







where the bar stands for the sample mean, vectors U and V
could be any matrices like the fingerprint estimation K̂ and
the query fingerprint K, range of indices i, j, τ1, τ2 in 7 is
1 ≤ i, τ1 ≤ n1, 1 ≤ j, τ2 ≤ n2.
Note that under H0, we correlate two i.i.d. Gaussian signals
since the fingerprint itself is well modeled by an i.i.d. Gaussian
random variable. It can be established from the central limit
theorem that in this case ρ(K̂1, K̂2; 0, 0) ∼ N (0, 1N ). Thus, in
order to set a fixed threshold for the correlation that guarantees




ρ(K, K̂; 0, 0)→
√
Nρ(K, K̂; 0, 0) (8)
A frequently used detection statistic is the Peak Correlation
to Energy ratio (PCE) or signed (PCE) also referred to as the
Circular Correlation Norm (CCN) defined as:
PCE(K, K̂) =





2(K, K̂; τ1, τ2)
(9)
where Nmax is a small neighborhood around the origin and
|Nmax| is the number of elements in the neighborhood. Note
that the PCE can be viewed as another way to normalize the
correlation - the denominator is an estimate of the correlation
variance under the assumption that it has a zero mean.
The case when H1 is rejected for an image that was captured
from the original camera that is tested is called false rejection.
False acceptance means accepting H1 when the image was
taken by another camera. We donote the false rejection rate
FRR and the false alarm rate FAR. The FRR is obtained from
experiments and depends mainly on image quality and content
and the number of images used to obtain the PRNU fingerprint
and their quality. Both FAR and FRR are functions of the
detection threshold.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section, we present the conducted experiments in
order to evaluate the robustness of image processing manipu-
lations (i.e., image filtering). To this end, we have employed
a publicly available camera cell phone identification dataset.
Detailed description of this dataset is found in IV-A. In
subsection IV-C, we study the effect of different training
set sizes employed to obtain the PRNU factor. Finally, in
subsection IV-D, we evaluate the performance of state-of-the
art blind camera identification methods in manipulated images.
A. Evaluation Dataset
The employed dataset is the BUSIM cell phone database [2].
This datasets consists of images captured from 16 models of
different cell phone cameras. There are six brands among those
16 devices which are Motorola, Nokia, Samsung, Sony, Treo
Palmone and LG. In fact, we have two Motorola models, five
Nokia, three Samsung, three Sony and one of Treo Palmone
and LG models. The camera models are listed in Table I,.
TABLE I
MODELS OF CAMERAS TESTED
LG 5600 Samsung D500
Motorola V3 Samsung D600
Motorola V500 Samsung E720
Nokia 5140 Sony K700
Nokia 6230 Sony K700
Nokia 6600 Sony K750
Nokia 6600 Sony P910
Nokia 7270 Treo Palmone
The dataset consists of 200 images with each device, a total
of 3200 images, with a maximum resolution of 640× 480 at
daylight, auto-focus mode and in JPEG format. The images
were typical shots varying from nature scenes to closeup of
people. We have separated 100 of them in two groups so as
to have a training and a testing set. For every experiment a
different set is created, with the exception of same type studies,
such as feature fusion (Figures 2 and 3), where the aim is
to examine the effect of a different approach on the same
data. The split of 1600 images used for training and testing
happens each time independently making sure that there are
no duplicate images in both training and testing set.
B. Feature fusion
In our first set of experiments, we compare two late fusion
models for camera identification. The camera identification
method proposed in Lukas et. al [3] suggests the use of pixel
luminosities in the RBG channel, followed by a late fusion
approach. That is, we follow the denoinsing and the averaging
of the fingerprints with RGB to grayscale transform and work
with their grayscale versions to compute the PCEs for H0 and
H1. The results of this method are presented on Figure 2
where we have the histograms of the logarithm of the PCE
values on the left and their ROC curves on the right. Its clear
from the ROC that the camera identification works fine with
this method and we can find a threshold t where the overall
accuracy will be higher than 95% with relatively small FAR
rate.
Fig. 2. Camera identification with RGB to grayscale late feature fusion
Furthermore, we explore a different feature fusion method,
which we have found that improves the accuracy of the
classifier. That is, after the denoising and the averaging of
the fingerprints, we concatenate each color channel one after
the other to create a vector of size 1440× 640. This vector is
thereby employed to compute the PCE for H0 and H1. The
results of this late fusion method are shown on Figure 3.
Fig. 3. Camera identification with concatenated color channels late feature
fusion
C. Number of images used to obtain PRNU factor
In our second set of experiments, we study the effect of
different number of images used to obtain the PRNU factor.
In order to generate the reference pattern, we employ the
denoised training set. To this end, we employed the same
Wavelet-based denoising filter by Mihkac et al. [18], that
Lucas et al.[3] proposed in their initial presentation of the
sensor fingerprint method. The PRNU pattern estimate is
found by averaging the noise residuals of the training set.
Once the reference pattern has been determined, it can be
used to identify whether the camera used to generate the
reference pattern was also used to capture a given query
image. The noise residual of the query image is obtained
and correlated with the reference PRNU pattern of each of
the known cameras. If the correlation is greater than a given
threshold t, the query image is classified to camera class with
the most similar PRNU pattern. Otherwise, it is considered
that the image was taken from another camera.
In order to measure the similarity between the fingerprint
and the image query, we employ PCE metric. The PCE is a
more stable test statistic than correlation as it is independent
of the image size and has other advantages. We introduced on
how PCE is obtained on ( 9) and we used Nmax to be a square
region 11 × 11 around the peak where the maximum of the
normalized correlation exists. For each camera fingerprint we
evaluate PCE under H1 for the remaining matching images of
the test set which will provide the data needed for estimating
the FRR. Similarly we evaluate PCE under H0 for all the non-
matching images of the test set to obtain the FAR. The PCE
histograms for each hypothesis differ greatly in size. For H1
we have a total of 1600 PCE values, while all the non matching
cases of H0 produce 24000 PCE scores. Those numbers stand
for every experiment that follows.
The sensor fingerprint is estimated with real content images
rather than flat fields. Previous works propose flat fields for
better results. To generate the reference pattern, a set of flat
field images are first created by capturing between 20 and 50
images of a uniformly lit surface using a known camera. For
example, out of focus images of a bright cloudy sky can be
used. However, experiments show that real content images can
perform as good as long as there are enough of them to draw
a better estimate. We have tested the performance for different
training set size that range from n = 5 to n = 100 images.
The collective ROC curves for each set are depicted in Figure
4.
Fig. 4. Different number of training image sets and their ROC curves
As can be seen, when real content images are employed
instead of flat fields, values of n = 20 or n = 50 are not
enough to provide a good estimation of the PRNU factor.
Instead, values of n = 100 should be employed. When the
content of the images is not flat field then a greater number
of images is required to achieve better results and higher
accuracies.
D. Camera classification under image manipulations
Finally, we study the effects of image manipulations in
camera classification. There are instances where the images
presented to a camera identifier are manipulated with mali-
cious or innocent intent. We have subjected our images under
the effects of low pass filter, contrast enhancement, histogram
equalization, gamma correction and white balance. Note that
we have not gone too far with the manipulations and every
attack is a subtle one (3 × 3 filters, small gamma correction
factors, etc.). We aim to produce results that can relate to real
life scenarios where either the attacker has a malicious intent
and wants to counterfeit an original photo or he simply puts
every image he captures under a desired filter for improving
the content of his image.
Some cases of manipulations such as histogram equalization
and white balance are applied with the same effect on all
images. While, the cases of low pass Gaussian and blur filter
as well as gamma correction have varying parameters on all
images. Such as 3 × 3 and 5 × 5 filters changing randomly
for blur and low pass Gaussian, and gamma correction factor
varying from γ ∈ [1.5, 3].
We have conducted two classification experiments according
to the aforementioned scenarios. In the first experiment, we
have put both the training set and the testing set under
the effect of the same manipulations. That is, we employed
n = 100 training images for each camera. This is the scenario
were we assume that all images might be subject of prior
manipulation, e.g., low-pass filter. The results for every filter
are presented collectively with their ROC curves on Figure 5.
Fig. 5. ROC curve of the ”innocent” image manipulations scenario, i.e.,
both the training set and the testing set are under the effect of the same
manipulations.
In our second scenario, the training set is not manipulated
with any filter. However, we assume that only the test set
have gone under image processing manipulations. This is the
scenario that relates to the malicious intent. The collective
results of this scenario are shown on Figure 6.
As can be seen, prior image manipulation of the training set
does not affect the performance of camera de-identification. In
all cases, the most effective filter for camera de-identification
is the White Balance filter as well as the low pass and blur
filters but this is mainly because of the 5× 5 filters which are
known to leave a visual impact on the image.
E. Camera classification under JPEG compression
Cell phone images can be highly compressed, hence the
effect of compression is studied. JPEG compression is an
Fig. 6. ROC curve of the ”malicious” image manipulations scenario, i.e.,
only the test set have gone under image processing manipulations.
important factor in determining the robustness of fingerprint,
since performance of fingerprint extraction algorithm degrades
due to compression. We have subjected our images under the
effects of JPEG compression with varying quality factors.
The quality factor of the JPEG algorithm is instrumental
in the accuracy of the camera identification algorithm. We
have produced results with three different values of quality,
q = 20, 50, 80. Quality factor values close to 100 mean almost
no effect to the original image. The same factor is applied
throughout all images.
Once again, two classification experiments are conducted.
First, both the training and testing set are under the effects of
JPEG compression. The collective results of this scenario for
three different quality factor values are presented on Figure
7.
Fig. 7. ROC of JPEG compression on both sets
In the second scenario, the training set does not go under
JPEG compression, having only the training set under the
alteration. The results of this experiment are shown on Figure
8.
It can be seen that JPEG compression can affect the iden-
tification algorithm especially when the quality factor is low
and the compression algorithm is used on both the images that
were used for the camera fingerprint estimation as well as the
query image. However, we should also note that when JPEG
compression quality factor q = 20 is employed, the resulting
image is visibly altered.
Fig. 8. ROC of JPEG compression on both sets
F. Camera de-identification by fingerprint removal
Finally, we investigate the scenario where the malicious user
intents to employ the PRNU factor from a set of images of
his own camera, and employ post-processing to remove it. In
this scenario, we have created a training set of n = 100 real
life images and estimated the PRNU factor for every camera
model. Afterwards, the estimated PRNU factor is subtracted
from the test set. Experimental results are shown in Figure
9. As can be seen, effective camera de-identification can be
obtained, which should be alarming to forensics investigators.
Fig. 9. Camera identification with fingerprint removed from testing images
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have presented a detailed study on camera
identification, on images manipulated by standard image pro-
cessing application. Experimental results have shown that the
camera identification is still possible when specific filtering ap-
plications have been applied. However, legal authorities should
be alarmed when advanced PRNU related manipulations have
been applied, which is not visible to the human eye. Future
work could include further evaluation in larger datasets, as
well as more detailed experimental analysis.
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